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Abstract
Background: Policymakers and regulators in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are weighing reforms to
their medical device approval and post-market surveillance systems. Data may be available that identify strengths and
weakness of the approaches to medical device regulation in these settings.
Methods and Findings: We performed a systematic review to find empirical studies evaluating medical device regulation in
the US or EU. We searched Medline using two nested categories that included medical devices and glossary terms
attributable to the US Food and Drug Administration and the EU, following PRISMA guidelines for systematic reviews. We
supplemented this search with a review of the US Government Accountability Office online database for reports on US Food
and Drug Administration device regulation, consultations with local experts in the field, manual reference mining of
selected articles, and Google searches using the same key terms used in the Medline search. We found studies of premarket
evaluation and timing (n=9), studies of device recalls (n=8), and surveys of device manufacturers (n=3). These studies
provide evidence of quality problems in pre-market submissions in the US, provide conflicting views of device safety based
largely on recall data, and relay perceptions of some industry leaders from self-surveys.
Conclusions: Few studies have quantitatively assessed medical device regulation in either the US or EU. Existing studies of
US and EU device approval and post-market evaluation performance suggest that policy reforms are necessary for both
systems, including improving classification of devices in the US and promoting transparency and post-market oversight in
the EU. Assessment of regulatory performance in both settings is limited by lack of data on post-approval safety outcomes.
Changes to these device approval and post-marketing systems must be accompanied by ongoing research to ensure that
there is better assessment of what works in either setting.
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As medical devices play a growing role in the diagnosis and
management of disease, the global medical device industry has
surpassed US$350 billion in annual revenue [1]. In the past
decade, new devices have offered improved treatment alternatives
for cardiovascular, orthopedic, oncologic, and many other
diseases. But new devices have also posed substantial risks to
patients, with high-profile recalls in recent years affecting breast
implants [2], specific types of artificial hips [3], devices for lung
surgery [4], and implantable cardioverter-defibrillator leads [5].
These episodes have led experts to call for greater pre-market
testing for safety and effectiveness of new devices and monitoring
of their performance after approval [6,7].
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU), two of
the most important world markets for medical devices, present
vastly different approaches to approving devices for use in patients
[8]. In the US, approximately two-thirds of all newly marketed
devices are exempt from formal evaluation by the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), including most low-risk (Class I)
devices such as stethoscopes. Most moderate-risk devices (Class II,
such as computed tomography scanners) and some high-risk
devices (Class III, such as pacemakers or replacement heart valves)
are cleared by the FDA through the ‘‘510(k)’’ pathway, based on
substantial equivalence to previously approved devices, without
requiring clinical trials. The highest risk devices are supposed to be
subjected to trials by the manufacturer testing clinical end points
and approved by the FDA through a process called pre-market
approval (PMA) [9]. PMA may include additional requirements
such as bench and animal testing as well as clinical data designed
to address safety and effectiveness. In the EU, medical devices
subjected to the PMA process in the US may be approved—that
is, granted a Conformite ´ Europe ´enne (CE) mark—by local
organizations called Notified Bodies based on more limited pre-
market testing merely showing that the devices work as intended in
a manner where the benefits outweigh the risks. Devices subject to
the EU process may be available to patients sooner, albeit with less
clinical experience prior to use.
Dissatisfaction with both the US and EU device approval and
post-market evaluation systems has reached a critical level [7,10–
12]. While the FDA has been criticized for its cumbersome
requirements and delays in approval [11,13], the system in the EU
has been charged with failing to gather meaningful data [12].
Reforms are being considered in both environments, as US
legislators debate the re-authorization of the Medical Device User
Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA) [14] and the European
Commission reviews the directives that regulate medical devices
[15]. Empirical data regarding medical device regulation should
inform policymakers in both settings. Thus, we sought to
systematically identify studies of the performance of the US and
EU medical device approval and post-market surveillance systems.
Our goal was to understand the evidence basis supporting changes
to each system and to identify, if possible, how current proposals
regarding alterations to medical device oversight might affect
patients, providers, industry, and public health in the US and EU.
Methods
Data Sources and Searches
Following PRISMA guidelines for systematic reviews (Text S1),
to obtain our starting sample, we performed a Medline search for
all articles listed prior to July 31, 2011 using two nested categories
that included medical devices and glossary terms attributable to
the FDA (e.g., ‘‘510(k)’’ and ‘‘PMA’’) and the EU (e.g., ‘‘notified
body’’ and ‘‘CE mark’’). We supplemented this search with a
review of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) online
database for reports on FDA device regulation using the same
search terms. No language requirement was placed on the
searches. After we obtained our initial sample, we used the titles
and abstracts to identify potential studies; we then obtained the full
articles to confirm which studies would be included in the
systematic review (Figure 1).
When the Medline search was complete, we consulted with both
US and EU experts in the field, engaged in manual reference
mining of our sample of articles, and, finally, conducted Google
searches using the same key terms used in the Medline search.
Google searches were deemed necessary based on our discussions
with local experts, from whom we learned that certain widely cited
reports in this field were conducted by management consultant
firms and directly disseminated as white papers, which would not
be captured by Medline or other academic databases.
Study Selection
Our prespecified inclusion criteria involved characteristics of the
studies themselves, and the data presented. Studies published in
peer-reviewed journals, reports disseminated as ‘‘white papers’’ in
digital or other publicly accessible media, or reports presented in a
public forum were eligible for inclusion. Case studies, editorials,
opinion pieces, commentaries, and reviews or meta-analyses
without original data or analysis were excluded.
Studies included must have reported empirical data about the
characteristics, performance metrics, or effectiveness of device
evaluation or post-market oversight in the US or EU. ‘‘Device
evaluation’’ was defined as regulatory assessment of medical
devices that occurred prior to marketing approval, while ‘‘post-
market oversight’’ was defined as regulatory management of
medical devices that occurred after approval. We did not assess
studies addressing other parts of the world. The data could be
gathered in a quantitative (e.g., rates of review times, rates of
recalls, or objective characteristics of the evaluation process) or
qualitative fashion (e.g., reports of surveys or focus groups). If not
published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, reports were
required to have identifiable methodologies/analytic approaches,
results, and discussion sections. Thus, routine statistical reports of
raw data, such as numbers of submissions and approvals posted as
part of FDA annual reporting, were excluded.
Data Extraction and Analysis
Two authors (D. B. K. and S. X.) separately extracted data from
the results sections of the included studies and categorized data
based on the aspect of device regulation that was assessed. We
noted the methodology and results, with particular focus on
sample size, research choices that might influence outcomes (such
as selection of denominators and calculations of medians versus
means), and whether public health end points were assessed. We
then reviewed the results and resolved differences by consensus
among the three investigators. We formally assessed the major
limitations of each study. Possible sources of bias in the included
studies were noted, including funding sources, methodological
limitations (including lack of detailed reporting of methods or
study instruments such as surveys or interview guides), and use of
peer review. Specific attention was paid to the data sources
analyzed by in the studies, such as survey samples and publicly
reported adverse event repositories. Because of the descriptive
nature of the extraction, kappa values for correlation were not
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a meta-analysis after qualitative data synthesis.
Results
The initial Medline and GAO searches returned 6,485 hits,
from which we ultimately identified nine to be included in our
analysis (Figure 1). Manual reference mining and Google searches
added an additional eight, and expert consultation added an
additional three studies. See Table 1 for a full summary of each
study or report identified.
Pre-Market Evaluation (n=9)
Empirical basis for approval (n=4). Four studies, all peer-
reviewed, addressed the empirical basis for approval. Two main
groups evaluated the scientific basis leading to high-risk device
approval in the US. The first group, consisting of Sanket Dhruva,
Lisa Bero, and Rita Redberg, reviewed 123 clinical studies
contributing to applications for 78 cardiovascular devices
approved via the PMA pathway from 2000 to 2007 [16]. They
found that about two-thirds of the PMA applications were
approved on the basis of a single study, and that the studies had
a mean enrollment of 308 patients (range 23–1,548). The studies
included 213 primary end points, of which 187 (88%) were
surrogate measures, such as target lesion revascularization for a
coronary artery stent and lead implant success for an electrophys-
iology device. Only 111 (52%) primary end points included
comparison with controls (including 34 retrospective controls).
When the authors looked at the characteristics of the 123 trials,
they found that 27% were randomized, and 14% were blinded.
Two subsequent studies used the same database. Chen et al.
highlighted the inclusion of ‘‘training’’ patients, defined in study
protocols as run-in, roll-in, or investigational as part of an
individual physician’s or center’s role in the overall pre-market
clinical experience [17]. Of the main sample of 123 studies, 20
(16%) enrolled training patients, but in all cases the training
patients were excluded from effectiveness analyses, and in only one
study were the training patients included in safety analyses.
Gender distribution was not reported in 34 (28%) of the 123
studies, and fewer than half reported gender-specific analyses or
comment [18], despite FDA requirements that they do so [19].
Another group, led by one of us (D. B. K.), also reviewed
clinical data submitted to the FDA during this period (2000 to
2007) for cardiovascular devices approved by the PMA pathway
[20]. The authors analyzed the quality of the safety and
effectiveness end points reported in the studies, defining ‘‘high
quality’’ end points as those containing clear definitions and a
specific time point for analysis. They found that effectiveness end
points were high quality in 82% of trials, while safety end points
were of high quality in 60%. High-quality subject accounting,
defined as follow-up for $90% of the study cohort, was found in
77%. The studies infrequently reported key cardiovascular co-
morbidities, often omitted participants’ race, and rarely included
pediatric patients.
The primary conclusion from these studies was that important
improvements could be made in the FDA approval of Class III
devices. Classic features of high-quality clinical trials—such as use
of randomization, active controls, and blinding—are often absent
in pre-market trials of new devices, although specific trial design
elements used in drug studies may not always be appropriate or
feasible for devices (e.g., blinding in a study of left ventricular assist
devices).
Approval timing (n=4). Four studies focused on the
duration of pre-market review in the US and EU. A collaboration
between the California Healthcare Institute and the Boston
Consulting Group, led by Gollaher and Goodall, compared the
time lag between EU and US approval for a convenience sample
of 12 medical device companies [21]. For these companies’ 46
devices approved via PMA, the time lag averaged about 3 y, and
increased from 1.2 y in 2004 (n=5) to 3.9 y in 2010 (n=3). For
devices cleared by the 510(k) pathway, differences in EU and FDA
approval times were less stark, as clearance in the US lagged by
only about 4 mo (range: 1 to 9 mo). In addition, the time lag for
510(k)-cleared devices tightened from 2008 to 2010, with an
average delay of only 18 d (n=61; range 0 to 3 mo) for US
clearance by 2010. In a subset of 105 510(k) products where the
FDA did not require submission of any new clinical data, the US
cleared 65 (57%) before the EU. In summary, outside of some
Class III devices approved through a full PMA (which account for
about 1% of all newly marketed devices), the data show limited
differences in approval times. This study was not peer-reviewed,
however, and its methods are obscure and subject to bias favoring
the views of device industry personnel.
Ralph Jugo of Qualify First International, a medical device
consultancy firm, evaluated the PMA filing and approval experience.
His first article reviewed PMA submissions from 2003 to 2007 that
were presented before advisory committees [22]. Jugo identified 42
total applications (38 original and four supplemental), including for
circulatory system devices (26%), general and plastic surgery devices
(19%), and orthopedic devices (14%). Among the 38 applications on
which the FDA had made a decision, 29 (76%) received a positive
Figure 1. PRISMA schematic of systematic review search
process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001276.g001
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Article (Year)
System
Studied Methodology Results General Conclusions
Studies of pre-market evaluation: empirical basis for device approval





33 of 123 studies (27%) were randomized
and 14% were blinded. 111 of 213 primary
end points (52%) were compared with
controls (31% retrospective). Of the primary
end points, 88% were surrogate markers
of effectiveness rather than ‘‘final’’
outcomes (e.g, mortality).
(1) Studies supporting cardiovascular PMAs
lack some of the hallmarks of well-designed
clinical trials, they may not accurately
represent women, and the results may not
be reported fairly.
(2) All four studies focused on original PMA
applications in one organ system,
challenging generalizability.
(3) Certain classic features of clinical trials,
such as randomization and blinding, are not
always possible in device trials.
(4) Comparative studies not performed in EU
due to lack of data availability.
Dhruva et al. [16] (2009) US [Same] Gender not reported in 34 of 123 studies
(28%); 41% of studies included analysis or
comment on gender-specific outcomes.
Chen et al. [17] (2011) US [Same] Only 20 of 123 (16%) studies included ‘‘training
patients’’ (the first individuals in whom a
device is tested). All training patients were
excluded from effectiveness analyses, and 95%
were excluded from safety analyses,
suggesting that the data submitted to FDA
may be biased in favor of the device’s
effectiveness and safety.
Kramer et al. [20] (2009) US [Same] Pivotal trial end points were of ‘‘high quality’’
for 82% of effectiveness end points and 60% of
safety end points. Subject accounting was
‘‘high quality’’ in 77% of studies.
Studies of pre-market evaluation: timing of approval
Gollaher and Goodall
[21] (2011)
US and EU Descriptive analysis of length
of pre-market evaluation and




In the US, after 2007, mean approval times
increased for devices approved via both
PMA (by 75%, to 27 mo) and 510(k) (by
43%, to 4.5 mo) processes. PMA pathway
devices approved on average 3 y earlier
in EU, compared with 4 mo earlier for
510(k) pathway devices.
(1) EU process appears faster than FDA for
high-risk devices (based on a small sample
size), but only slightly faster for medium-risk
devices.
(2) Most FDA-approved high-risk devices are
supported by advisory panels; delays in high-
risk device approval are multifactorial and
include multiple application amendments.
Jugo [23] (2007) US Descriptive analysis of 42 PMA
applications submitted to FDA
(2002–2007) and records of
advisory committee meetings
31 of 38 applications (82%) were approved
(four still pending), 29 having received positive
recommendation from the advisory
committee. PMA applications took an average
of 1.4 y to complete, with delays due in part to
numerous amendments from applicants (on
average 13/application).
Jugo [24] (2008) US [Same] Among the seven rejected applications in the
sample, common reasons for rejection
included design flaws and statistical concerns.
Jugo [23] (2008) US and EU Same, with additional
comparison to EU regulatory
history of same devices
Of the 42 devices, 23 confirmed to receive US
and EU approval. Among these devices, EU
approval was received on average 3.5 y earlier
than US.
Studies of pre-market evaluation: classification in the US
GAO [25] (2009) US Descriptive analysis of device
submissions to FDA
(2003–2007)
13,199 submissions for Class I and II devices
via the 510(k) process (90% cleared); 217
original and 784 supplemental PMA
submissions for Class III devices (78% and
85% cleared, respectively). 342 submissions
for Class III devices went through the
510(k) process; 228 (67%) cleared.
Many high-risk devices are still cleared
through the 510(k) process; no analysis into
why these mischaracterizations occurred.
Medical Device Evaluation in the US and EU
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Article (Year)
System
Studied Methodology Results General Conclusions
Studies of device recalls: US
Zuckerman et al.
[26] (2011)
US Descriptive analysis of FDA
recalls (2005–2009) and
approval pathways of devices
that were recalled
Of 113 recalls, 80 (71%) were cleared via
510(k) process while eight (7%) had been
exempted from review. 13 (16%) 510(k)-
cleared devices had been designated as
Class III high-risk devices, potentially
more appropriate for PMA pathway.
(1) Most recalls affect devices cleared via
non-PMA pathways, though majority of
cleared devices are not recalled.
(2) Recalls of specific devices can affect very
few or millions of units/patients, making the
clinical impact of recalls overall more difficult
to adjudicate.
(3) Some recalls may not have been avoided
with more thorough pre-market review.
(4) Recalls poorly measure system
performance, given complexities in
recognizing post-market events and
translating these into FDA action
Hall [28] (2010) US Descriptive analysis of FDA
recalls and comparison to
510(k) clearances during same
time period (2005–2009)
31 of 118 recalls (28%) involved automated
external defibrillators and infusion pumps. 95
(81%) were approved through the 510(k)
process. During this period, 99.6% of 19,873
510(k)-approved devices did not lead to safety-
related recalls.
Maisel [29] (2010) US Descriptive analysis of FDA
510(k) submissions and recalls
using time-to-recall as
outcome measure
For approximately 3,000 devices cleared




US Descriptive analysis of FDA
recalls (2004–2006) and
reasons for recall
70 (average 23.3/y) recalls involving 184
devices were adjudicated as mechanical (37%)
or electrical (19%) issues. Among recalls, 57%




US Descriptive analysis of FDA
recalls and comparison to
510(k) and PMA approvals
during that time (2005–2010)
Recalls involved 0.16% of devices approved via
510(k) pathway and 0.85% of devices
approved via PMA pathway. About half of
recalls were due to pre-market design
deficiencies, 29% to manufacturing problems,
and 6% to labeling problems.
GAO [32] (2011) US Descriptive analysis of FDA
recalls (2005–2009) and
interviews with FDA staff
Of 3,510 device recalls, 140 (4%) were high-risk
recalls involving substantial danger for
patients. Interviews revealed insufficient FDA
internal review of recall episodes.
Studies of device recalls: EU and US/EU comparisons
Heneghan et al.
[33] (2011)
EU Descriptive analysis of UK
recalls (2006–2010) and
requests to manufacturers for
data on recalled devices
2,124 Field Safety Notifications and 447
Medical Device Alerts were found, covering
197 withdrawn or recalled devices. Only 2%
of manufacturers provided data for
evaluating the pre-market data and safety
assessments.
(1) Details of pre-market evaluation and
specific safety problems are rarely accessible
in EU for recalled devices.
(2) Timing of high-risk recalls similar in US
and EU. Rates of recalls similar on an
absolute scale, but not a relative scale, given
greater number of device approvals in EU
Davis et al. [34] (2011) EU and US Descriptive analysis of devices
recalled in EU (2005–2009),
results matched to US recalls,
and comparisons made to
existing US data
The authors estimated about 105 high-risk
recalls in the EU during this period, similar on
an absolute scale to the US. 45% were due to
pre-market problems, comparable to rates in
the US. Authors matched 126 moderate- or
high-risk recalls to recalls in the US. Recall
notifications posted about 3 wk earlier in the




US and EU Survey of industry leaders EU process characterized by high levels of
predictability (85%, versus 22% for FDA),
reasonability (91% versus 25%), and
transparency (85% versus 27%). Overall,
75% of respondents viewed EU experience
as excellent or very good, versus 16% for
FDA experience.
(1) EU viewed as a simpler, less rigorous
process, but result may be related to
response bias.
(2) FDA data requirements and process
inefficiencies considered by industry to
impede innovation and limit patient access
to novel devices.
(3) Surveys poorly done, limited by small
sample sizes
Medical Device Evaluation in the US and EU
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ly approved by the FDA, and another two (5%) received a negative
recommendation from the advisory committee but were approved
anyway (a total approval rate of 82%). For 31 applications for which
data were available, the average review period was 513 d (16.8 mo).
Twelve applications (39%) were designated for expedited review,
which is generally reserved for devices that are a breakthrough
technology addressing an unmet clinical need. These PMAs had an
average review period of 402 d (13 mo). There were several causes
for PMA approval delays, including amendments (13 filings on
average per application) that provided additional information on
submissions.
Jugo then evaluated the EU approval status of these same 42
devices [23]. Of the 23 that received FDA and EU approval, all
received EU approval first (average time lag: 3.5 y; range 34 d to
8.5 y). An additional five devices received EU approval and were
later rejected by the FDA (average time lag: 4.7 y). These
calculations may be inaccurate, however, because lack of available
data forced Jugo to estimate dates of receipt of EU approval for an
unspecified number of devices.
Jugo’s final paper assessed the seven devices that were rejected by
the FDA from 2002 to 2007 [24]. Out of these seven rejections, five
received EU approval. Reasons for the FDA rejection included (1)
clinical study design flaws, (2) missing clinical data, (3) failure to
achieve statistical significance for important end points, (4) failure to
demonstrate clinical benefits, and (5) persistent safety concerns. The
author did not find safety problems reported by France, Germany,
or the United Kingdom (UK) related to the five devices rejected by
the FDA, and concluded (based on this extremely limited sample)
that the EU regulatory system has a lower burden of proof for
approval and faster approval time, without risk to patient safety. A
major limitation of this analysis, however, is that documents related
to rejected PMA applications are not made public unless released
along with other materials related to advisory panel meetings.
Pre-market classification in the US (n=1). A 2009 GAO
report found that from 2003 to 2007, the FDA evaluated 13,199
submissions for Class I and Class II devices via the 510(k) process
(90% cleared) and 217 original and 784 supplemental PMA
submissions for Class III devices (78% and 85% cleared,
respectively) [25]. In that same time period, the FDA reviewed
342 submissions for Class III devices through the 510(k) process,
clearing 228 (67%) of these submissions. The GAO concluded that
these devices needed to be either reclassified to a different device
class or required to seek approval via PMA.
Device Recalls (n=8)
Recalls in the US (n=6). Zuckerman et al. analyzed FDA
recalls from 2005 to 2009 that were designated as having the
highest clinical importance (reasonable chance for serious health
problems or death) [26]. Of 113 recalls, 80 (71%) had previously
been cleared by the 510(k) pathway, while another eight (7%) were
exempt from review. Interestingly, 13 (16%) of the 80 devices
cleared by the 510(k) pathway were designated as high-risk (Class
III) devices, even though Class III devices are intended to be
subject to the more rigorous PMA application process [27]. The
authors suggested that if some of the 510(k)-cleared devices in this
sample had been subject to a PMA application process, their risks
may have been identified sooner, although the small sample sizes
in those studies may not have allowed these malfunctions to be
detected even by the heightened PMA application review
standards. In the study, one device type (automated external
defibrillators) was responsible for nearly all of the recalls affecting
Class III devices cleared through the 510(k) process.
In a report presented to the Institute of Medicine but not peer-
reviewed, Ralph Hall identified 118 unique recalls from 2005 to
2009 that were designated by the FDA as involving the greatest
safety concerns (i.e., Class I recalls) [28]. The largest subset of
recalls (31, 28%) was associated with automated external
defibrillators and infusion pumps. Hall found that the majority
of recalled devices (95, 81%) were cleared through the 510(k)
process, although he concluded that only 48% of those recalls
were related to safety data that could have been identified
through pre-market review. He then compared these recalls to
the 19,873 510(k) applications during that time and calculated
that 99.6% of 510(k) submissions did not lead to safety-related
recalls. Hall concluded that additional human clinical studies
would not significantly impact these recalls, given that there are
few undiscovered clinical issues. However, it is highly subjective
to postulate what would have been identified with pre-market
review. The Hall report is also limited by its focus on only the
highest risk recalls, which are less common than other types of
recalls, and by his choice of a denominator that serves to
diminish potential device risks. Using submissions rather than
approvals as the sample further complicates his analysis.
Additionally, his raw calculations of recall rates did not take
into account differing marketing times for the individual devices,
which may influence the likelihood of a given device being
recalled.
William Maisel presented data on 510(k) submissions from 1996
to 2009 and recalls of all types (low, medium, and high risk) from
2003 to 2009 [29]. Though also not peer-reviewed, Maisel’s study
evaluated recalls using a more robust and statistically defensible
survival analysis method than Hall [28], assessing the proportion
of 510(k) clearances that were free from recall action at 1-y post-
market intervals. Maisel calculated an annual recall rate of




Studied Methodology Results General Conclusions
PricewaterhouseCoopers
[1] (2011)
US and EU Structured interviews with
industry leaders
FDA perceived as having more rigorous and
lengthier device approval process than EU.
PricewaterhouseCoopers
[36] (2011)
US and EU Survey of industry leaders 40% of respondents believed FDA rejected
applications because of lack of resources. 63%
reported FDA changed its opinion during the
review process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001276.t001
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92.6% of devices were free from recall. Recalls were more
common for devices with larger numbers of predicates and for life-
sustaining devices cleared through 510(k).
An earlier study by Villarraga et al. analyzed a subset of recalls
from 2004 to 2006 [30]. The authors identified 70 serious recalls
involving 184 devices by searching through the FDA’s online
databases and enforcement reports. The majority of recalls were
attributed to mechanical (37%) or electrical (19%) problems. Post-
market issues such as manufacturing (4% of recalls), contamination
(4%), or shipping (3%) represented a minority of absolute recalls.
By recall number, 57% were associated with Class II (moderate
risk) devices and 20% with Class III devices. This study also
reported the number of units (individual products) affected by the
recalls in question. Over 28 million units were subject to recall,
but—as was the case in the Hall report and the Zuckerman et al.
study—these were distributed unequally, as approximately 12
million units were recalled insulin pumps or blood glucometers
with mechanical failures.
A non-peer-reviewed report self-published by the Battelle
Memorial Institute (funded by AdvaMed, a trade association
representing the medical technology industry) reviewed FDA high-
priority recalls from January 2005 to May 2010 [31]. Instead of
submissions, this study used total clearances as the denominator,
and found that 0.16% of devices cleared along the 510(k) pathway
and 0.85% of devices approved along the PMA pathway resulted
in recalls. Approximately 50% of recalls were due to pre-market
design deficiencies, with 29% due to manufacturing problems and
6% to labeling problems. The group concluded that the vast
majority of submissions and eventual clearances and approvals
emerging from the FDA do not result in serious recalls.
Finally, a 2011 GAO report evaluated the FDA’s response to
3,510 device recalls occurring from 2005 to 2009 [32]. 140 recalls
(4%) were characterized as high risk (those most likely to lead to
patient harm). In exploring these data through interviews with
FDA staff, the GAO found the lack of a systematic, timely
approach to analyzing recall data, such as time-trend analyses or
device- or specialty-specific analyses. The GAO also evaluated the
‘‘audit checks’’ associated with the high-risk recalls, which involved
calls to device users from the FDA intended to confirm that they
had been contacted by the manufacturer and had received
instructions related to the device malfunction. Among over 2,000
audit checks, nearly 90% had inconsistencies in performance and
documentation, indicating a lack of consistency in this process and
making it difficult to identify whether a recall had been successfully
carried out.
Recalls in the EU and US/EU comparisons (n=2). We
found one study of device recalls in the EU. Heneghan et al.
analyzed UK medical device recalls from 2006 to 2010 [33]. Using
a database of public notification maintained by the Medicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority, the authors found
2,124 Field Safety Notifications (disseminated by a manufacturer
when a device needs to be recalled for any reason) and 447
Medical Device Alerts (disseminated by the Medicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority to relate critical safety
information to device users). The devices at issue ranged from
high-risk devices (60, 13%) to low-risk devices (132, 30%). The 447
Medical Device Alerts covered 197 withdrawn or recalled devices,
but when the authors sought information from the manufactur-
er—including the name of the approving body, where the device
was manufactured, the clinical data supporting the device’s EU
approval, and details of the safety issue—about the 192 devices for
which manufacturer contact information was available, only four
(2%) manufacturers provided the requested data. The annual
number of Medical Device Alerts stayed relatively consistent
during the 5-y study period (range: 73–100), though the number of
Field Safety Notifications increased by 1,220% (62 in 2006 to 757
in 2010).
Finally, we found one report (not peer-reviewed) by a
management consulting firm, funded by AdvaMed, directly
comparing EU and US recalls from 2005 to 2009 [34]. Since the
EU lacks a centralized reporting system for adverse events
related to medical devices, Davis et al. compiled a dataset of
recalls based on National Competent Authority Reports,
involving a process that all member companies are required to
perform in reporting major safety issues for medical devices, and
Field Safety Notifications, the system through which the EU
member states that are most active in device safety reporting (the
UK, France, Ireland, and Germany) post public notifications.
After collecting EU device safety reports, two independent
reviewers identified the most severe threats to public health,
which would allow direct comparisons to FDA high-risk recalls.
In addition, a factor of 1.66 was employed to scale up the recalls
to cover the entire EU, since Field Safety Notifications from only
five member states were used. In total, the authors estimated
about 105 high-risk recalls in the EU for medical devices from
2005 to 2009. The study concluded that recalls for medical
devices were comparable between the FDA and EU in terms of
absolute number. When the authors matched 126 high- and
moderate-risk recalls from the EU to similar recalls in the US,
t h e yf o u n da ne v e ns p l i tb e t w e e nr e c a l l sr e p o r t e df i r s ti nt h eE U
(11) and in the US (12). The EU reported more (61%) of the less
severe recalls earlier than in the US. On average, notifications in
the EU were posted approximately 3 wk earlier than in the US.
However, the lack of an EU centralized reporting system makes
it difficult to know whether all EU device recalls were captured,
or to assess the accuracy of the 1.66 scale factor. Also, the
thresholds for issuing recalls may not be the same in the US and
EU, further complicating comparisons.
Surveys of Device Manufacturers
We found three surveys of device manufacturers, all conducted
by business consultants and not peer-reviewed. Makower et al.
surveyed the opinions of 204 medical device manufacturers,
representing 20% of all US device manufacturers who are
‘‘actively working on bringing innovative new medical devices to
market’’ (but only 4% of all medical device manufacturers
registered with the FDA) [35]. The survey was designed to assess
respondents’ experiences working with FDA and EU authorities
and was funded by the Medical Device Manufacturers Association
(a trade association), the National Venture Capital Association,
and relevant state business associations. Respondents viewed the
EU approval system in a more positive light than the FDA,
agreeing that EU authorities are highly or mostly predictable
(85%, versus 22% for FDA), reasonable (91% versus 25%), and
transparent (85% versus 27%). Seventy-five percent of respondents
viewed their overall experience with the EU as excellent or very
good, compared to only 16% for the FDA. Companies reported a
total cost of US$31 million per device cleared via the 510(k)
pathway (with 77% [US$24 million] spent on activities related to
FDA approval) compared to US$94 million per device approved
via PMA application (with 80% [US$75 million] on activities
related to FDA approval). The authors concluded that the FDA’s
clinical data requirements, extended delay times, and inefficient
processes were inferior to the EU system, weakened innovation,
and harmed patients.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a global consultancy, analyzed med-
ical technology innovation in two separate reports funded by large
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interviews with executives at 13 US-based medical technology
companies, whose firms represented 10% of revenue in this field.
This report found that the FDA was perceived as having a more
rigorous and lengthier device approval process, as compared to
Germany, the UK, and France [1]. The second survey collected a
convenience sample of 50 company representatives at BIOCOM,
a regional conference of 550 southern California life science
companies [36]. The cohort included 19 companies developing
medical devices with revenues ranging from under US$10 million
to over US$500 million. Forty percent of respondents believed the
FDA rejected applications because of the lack of staffing resources.
In addition, 63% of respondents reported that the FDA changed
its opinion during the review process.
The text of the survey questions and interview guides did not
accompany the Makower et al. [35] and PricewaterhouseCoopers
[1,36] reports, and independent confirmation of specific assertions
was not provided, limiting interpretation of the responses.
Additionally, the non-random selection of participants may have
biased the responses.
Discussion
Our systematic review of the empirical data evaluating US and
EU device approval and post-market surveillance systems found
quality problems in pre-market submissions in the US, provided
snapshots of post-market experiences in the US and EU derived
from recall analyses, and reported findings from surveys of some
industry leaders.
These studies and reports provide a few reasonably firm
conclusions. The FDA, which is the subject of all but one (19/20,
95%) of the studies and reports in our sample, could improve
oversight of device approval in important ways. For example, the
GAO report [32] and Zuckerman et al. [26] point to concerning
practices that permit approval of high-risk devices based on
limited evidence. In response, the FDA has committed to
completing a reclassification by the end of 2012 [37]. It is also
of concern that many PMA approvals in the US are based on
studies with poorly defined end points, or those without blinding
or randomization. Though these features are assumed to be
consistent with high-quality clinical trials, they may not be
realistic for studies of some devices. Better post-market surveil-
lance of devices approved based on such limited data is necessary
[8].
In general, though, the outcomes addressed by the studies in our
review limit the ability to draw conclusions from them. For
example, using recalls to measure the safety record of individual
devices or classes of devices is flawed. Particular devices may be
over- or underrepresented in recall data depending on the
frequency of their use, design complexity, and the clinical
manifestations of malfunction. A device malfunction must also
be reported to the regulatory agency in a way that supports data
aggregation and analysis. For example, the recall of the Medtronic
Sprint Fidelis implantable cardioverter-defibrillator lead occurred
in October 2007 due to higher-than-expected rates of lead
fracture. The recall occurred 3 y after the device was approved
and 3 mo after publication of a pivotal case series by Hauser et al.
[38]. During the time Fidelis was on the US market, the FDA had
collected 679 Fidelis-related reports, but had not yet identified a
specific problem, in part because these reports were of variable
quality and dwarfed by the overall number of adverse event
submissions. As this case shows, the vigilance of patients, clinicians,
and regulators weighs heavily in the likelihood of actually
identifying device problems and potential reasons for recalls.
Because the progression from device malfunction to problem
recognition, analysis, reporting, and eventual recall may not be
straightforward, using recall rates alone cannot judge the success
or failure of a system [39].
We also found almost no data rigorously addressing device
regulation in the EU, apart from a few studies evaluating the
timing of approval. While case reports have suggested substantial
dangers to EU patients from devices approved on the basis of
limited data, no researchers have been able to systematically
compare the quality of studies used for device approval or post-
approval safety outcomes between the EU and US. A primary
reason for this is the lack of transparency among the EU Notified
Bodies, which generally do not release the data upon which they
make their approval determinations. Thus, system changes that
elucidate the basis for EU device approval are essential for
policymakers seeking to identify the ways in which the system is
functioning effectively, and to evaluate the ways it can be
improved.
This systematic review has certain limitations. Despite supple-
menting our search with conversations with local experts in the field
and searches of internal citations, we could have missed published
studies or reports in this field. In addition, we found a number of
studies wherethe data collection techniquesused bythe authors cast
doubt on their results. For example, the surveys reviewed here are
limited by biased sample selection, small response rates, recall bias
and lack of independent verification of reported costs, variability in
the survey responder within companies, and social desirability
response bias inresponsesfrom devicemanufacturer representatives
[40]. Few legitimate conclusions can be drawn from these surveys.
As another example of the limitations of the reports, in their
calculations of US and EU review times, both the Gollaher and
Goodall report [21] and the Jugo studies [22–24] used mean times
rather than medians, which may skew their results based on outlier
data. In addition, the Gollaher and Goodall report used calendar
daysratherthan actual reviewdays, complicatingcomparisons.As a
result, when the FDA presented time estimates in a recent
performance report submitted to Congress, the agency reported
that high-risk PMA-approved devices were approved after an
average of 1.2 y in 2010—compared to 3.9 y in the Gollaher and
Goodall report [41]. The latter figure was also derived from only
three devices, further limiting its import.
Despite these limitations, this systematic review does provide
some insights for policymakers seeking to reform device regulation
in the US and EU, including the need for greater transparency
and coordinated oversight in the EU. Yet it still remains unclear
whether the US or EU approach achieves better outcomes for
patients receiving devices. This assessment is further complicated
by the multiple stakeholders—including patients, payors, physi-
cians, and manufacturers—whose perspectives on system perfor-
mance vary by virtue of how they weigh the importance of
outcomes such as cost, speed, safety, and effectiveness. Thus, any
future changes to these device approval and post-marketing
systems must be accompanied by ongoing research to ensure that
there is better assessment of these outcomes in both the US and
EU settings. Developing such evidence can promote better use of
public resources, and avoid burdensome and ineffective regula-
tions. Until there is a more sustained commitment to developing
these data, policymakers will continue to struggle to provide
regulatory solutions.
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Background. Medical devices—health technologies that
are not medicines, vaccines, or clinical procedures—cover a
vast range of equipment from the simple to the more
complex. Medical devices are essential for patient care, and
in the past decade, new devices have offered improved
treatment alternatives for many diseases and conditions,
leading to substantial growth in the US$350 billion medical
device industry. However, new medical devices also pose
substantial risks to patients, as shown in recent high-profile
product recalls involving breast implants and artificial hip
implants.
Why Was This Study Done? Concerns about the safety of
new medical devices have led to calls for greater testing of
the safety and effectiveness of new devices before they
come on the market and for improved monitoring of their
performance after new devices have been approved for use
by a regulatory body. In this study, the researchers
systematically reviewed evidence about the performance of
medical device approval and post-market surveillance
systems in two of the most important world markets for
medical devices—the United States and the European Union.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
performed a keyword search in Medline (a database of
published biomedical literature) for all relevant articles, and
supplemented this search with a review of reports on Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) device regulation in the US
Government Accountability Office’s online database. Then
they consulted with both US and EU experts and also
conducted Google searches to capture reports by manage-
ment consultant firms. The researchers included only those
studies that reported empirical data, either qualitative or
quantitative, about the characteristics, performance metrics,
or effectiveness of device evaluation or post-market over-
sight in the US or EU.
Using these methods the researchers identified nine studies
that focused on pre-market evaluation and timing, eight
studies of device recalls, and three surveys of device
manufacturers. Because of the variable quality and lack of
outcomes from these studies and reports, the researchers
concluded that these studies offered only limited insights
into either the US or EU systems. But the available evidence
does suggest that in the US, the FDA could improve
oversight of device approval, for example, by following up
on its commitment to reclassify high-risk medical devices
and improve post-market surveillance of devices that are
approved on the basis of limited data. The researchers also
suggest that using recalls to measure the safety record of
individual devices or classes of devices is flawed, as particular
devices may be over- or underrepresented in recall data
depending on the frequency of their use, design complexity,
and the clinical manifestations of malfunction. In the EU,
apart from a few studies addressing the timing of approval,
the researchers found almost no robust data on device
regulation. Some case reports suggested substantial dangers
to patients in the EU from devices approved on the basis of
limited data, but the researchers could not systematically
compare the quality of studies used for device approval or
post-approval safety outcomes between the EU and US,
mainly because of the lack of transparency among the EU
regulators (Notified Bodies).
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings show
that few studies have quantitatively assessed medical device
regulation in either the US or EU, but the existing studies
examined in this review suggest that policy reforms are
necessary for both device approval and post-market evalu-
ation of performance, including improving classification of
devices in the US and promoting transparency and post-
market oversight in the EU. However, assessment of
regulatory performance in both the US and EU is limited
by lack of data on post-approval safety outcomes. Any
changes to medical device approval and post-marketing
systems should be accompanied by ongoing research and
evaluation to ensure that there is an improved assessment of
what works in either setting.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001276.
N This study is further discussed in a PLoS Medicine
Perspective by Sanket Dhruva and Rita Redberg
N The WHO website has a comprehensive topic section on
medical devices
N Information on medical devices is also available from the
FDA and the European Commission
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